Introduction

Administrative corruption is recognized as one of the most significant barriers to sustainable urban development and a major factor in eroding public trust in governmental institutions. Among public organizations, municipalities are particularly vulnerable to corruption due to their extensive responsibilities—ranging from issuing building permits to implementing large-scale infrastructure projects and managing substantial local revenues—and high financial turnover. Bushehr Province, with its seven active municipalities in the cities of Bushehr, Borazjan, Khormoj, Deyr, Asaluyeh, Deylam, and Ganaveh, presents a unique condition for the emergence and persistence of administrative corruption. Such a condition stems from specific economic characteristics (heavy reliance on unstable construction-related revenues), strong tribal and kinship-based social structures, frequent managerial changes driven by city council election cycles, and geographic concentration of industrial and port activities in certain areas. Hitherto, no dedicated, comprehensive study has specifically examined corruption-prone contexts across all municipalities in this province. Earlier studies have either been conducted at the national level or focused on individual large cities such as Tehran or Shiraz, limiting the direct applicability of their findings to Bushehr Province. Moreover, most existing studies have employed quantitative methods or grounded theory approaches, whereas the real-world dynamics of municipalities demand a purely qualitative methodology grounded in the lived experiences of seasoned experts. The present study was designed to fill this research gap by providing a realistic, comprehensive, and generalizable portrait of corruption-prone contexts in Bushehr Province municipalities, relying on the perspectives of long-serving managers and experts, with the aim of accurately identifying the six primary contexts, prioritizing them, and offering practical solutions.



Methodology

This research adopted a qualitative design using an inductive content analysis approach. The study population comprised all managers, deputy managers, and experts with over 15 years of experience across the seven municipalities of Bushehr Province (approximately 470 individuals). Purposive sampling with maximum geographic and organizational variation was employed until full theoretical saturation was achieved, resulting in a final sample of 15 key informants (2 former managers, 2 former deputies, and 11 senior experts). Data were collected through semi-structured interviews consisting of seven main questions aligned with the six predefined contexts (social, cultural, economic-financial, administrative, technical, and political) plus one open-ended question. Interviews were conducted in-person or virtually, with informed consent and audio recording; the average duration was 75 minutes. Data analysis was performed utilizing MAXQDA 2022 software through open coding and thematic organization into the six primary contexts. Credibility and trustworthiness were ensured through triangulation, member checking, and peer debriefing.



Results and Discussion

Analysis of the 15 interviews yielded a total of 487 open codes, systematically organized into six main corruption-prone contexts. Expert consensus identified the economic-financial context as the most critical and pervasive (mean score 4.73/5, endorsed by 13 of 15 experts), driven primarily by inadequate salaries and benefits, heavy dependence on unstable construction-related revenues, widespread broker activity, and collusion in tenders and contracts. The administrative context ranked second (mean 4.60), characterized by lengthy and complex procedures, multiple “golden signatures,” concentration of decision-making power in specific individuals, and ineffective electronic systems. The political context (mean 4.47, endorsed by 11 experts) highlighted direct interference by city councils in executive affairs, pressure from higher authorities, and frequent managerial turnover. The social context encompassed nepotism, tribal pressures, and silence regarding relatives’ violations; the cultural context involved normalization of “sweetener” payments and religious-traditional justifications; and the technical context included weak field supervision, issuance of formal certificates without verification, and exploitation of Article 100 Commissions as revenue sources. These six contexts operate in an interconnected manner: the economic-financial, administrative, and political contexts form a core triangle that generates motive, opportunity, and political-social justification, while the remaining three act as reinforcing catalysts. Draw an analogy with prior studies revealed strong alignment with Imani (2024a, b), Hemmati et al. (2023), and Karimi-Nejad et al. (2023), though in Bushehr Province the stronger tribal fabric elevates the weight of nepotism and kinship-based favoritism compared to Tehran or Shiraz. Internationally, findings resonate with Bhagat et al. (2024) on organizational integrity climate and supervision deficits and with Torsello (2023) on the role of organizational culture in normalizing corruption, confirming that the six-dimensional pattern identified in Bushehr municipalities represents a classic, generalizable case of structural-cultural corruption in public organizations.



Conclusion

The study conclusively demonstrates that administrative corruption in Bushehr Province municipalities is neither a unidimensional nor merely individual phenomenon but the result of simultaneous interaction among six deeply intertwined contexts—economic-financial, administrative, political, social, cultural, and technical—with the first three serving as the core nucleus and the latter three as reinforcers. Near-unanimous agreement among the 15 key experts on the presence of all contexts across every municipality in the province underscores the deep pervasiveness of corruption and its transformation into a dominant organizational culture. Without concurrent reform of salaries and benefits, simplification and transparency of procedures, restriction of political interference, and cultural change regarding acceptance of informal payments, any anti-corruption initiative will remain superficial and ineffective. This research signals that the era of piecemeal measures has ended and a comprehensive provincial-national program centered on three practical proposals—establishment of an employee compensation fund, full implementation of e-government with a maximum of three signatures, and amendment of council and municipality laws to curb political interference—is urgently required to achieve sustainable corruption reduction and restore public trust.